Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law by Epstein, Richard A.
San Diego Law Review
Volume 42 | Issue 1 Article 2
2-1-2005
Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation
of Copyright Law
Richard A. Epstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Digital Copyright Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Digital USD. It has been accepted for
inclusion in San Diego Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital USD. For more information, please contact digital@sandiego.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus Property? Cracks in the Foundation of Copyright Law, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 1 (2005).
Available at: https://digital.sandiego.edu/sdlr/vol42/iss1/2




Liberty versus Property?  Cracks in the 
Foundations of Copyright Law 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN* 
The purpose of this Article is to recanvass what is surely old and 
familiar territory about the defenses, if any, that can be made for various 
forms of intellectual property—in this instance, particularly copyright—as 
a matter of both natural law and utilitarian theory, broadly conceived.  In 
dealing with this issue, it is important to note that within the Lockean 
tradition, the function of representative government is to protect the 
lives, liberties, and estates of the individuals who, as subjects or citizens, 
are subject to the exercise of state power.1  There is little doubt that this 
formulation of the matter has exerted profound influence over the 
structure of American thought and constitutionalism.  For instance, it is 
not necessary to look any further than the two constitutional commands 
that provide that no individual be deprived (by either state or national 
 *  James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of 
Chicago; The Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution.  My 
thanks to Eric Murphy for his valuable research assistance.  This Article is based on a 
paper originally presented at the June 2003 conference, Promoting Markets in Creativity: 
Copyright in the Internet Age, in Washington, D.C.  The conference was organized by 
the Progress & Freedom Foundation and the National Center for Technology and Law at 
the George Mason University School of Law.  I have also benefitted from comments of 
particpants of workshops at Fordham, Stanford, and the University of Chicago Law 
School. 
 1. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT & A LETTER CONCERNING 
TOLERATION ch. IX, para. 123  (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale University Press 2003) (1689).  
This [the insecurity of a state of nature] . . . which, however free, is full of 
fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason that he seeks out, and 
is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind 
to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I 
call by the general name property. 
Id. 




government) of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.2
For these purposes there are two elements of this formulation that 
deserve some brief mention.  First, the phrase “without due process of 
law” has been long, if controversially, understood to cover situations in 
which individuals are deprived of life, liberty, or property without just 
compensation.3  In this regard, the Due Process Clauses mirror the more 
specific language of the Takings Clause, which provides: “[N]or shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”4  
But for our purposes, the more important claim within this clause is the 
ostensible parity between liberty and property in the constellation of 
constitutionality, and, by implication, political values. 
This yoking together of liberty and property has an obvious appeal for 
individuals who operate within the classical liberal tradition and view 
private property in its various manifestations as consistent with a regime 
of personal liberty.  But notwithstanding the ease by which it is possible 
to run these two phrases together, it hardly follows that this coupling 
should be regarded as a necessary truth, to be denied only on pain of 
self-contradiction.5  In fact, a complete defense of both liberty and 
property requires a painstaking examination of the strength of each of 
these claims separately.  Indeed, it requires some ingenuity to defend the 
ostensible parity between liberty and property when we deal with 
property in the tangible realm.  The doubts about the parallelism 
between the two are, if anything, even more insistent in the realm of 
intellectual property.  Some commentators, such as James DeLong6 and 
Adam Mossoff,7 see a tight connection between natural law and 
intellectual property.  But their views probably represent a minority 
position.  There are many people who think that the current scope of the 
copyright laws sets up intellectual property in opposition to human 
liberty of speech and expression, such that in the contest between the 
two, the copyright law comes out second best behind these liberties.  
 2. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.  The former applies to the national government, 
and the latter to the states. 
 3. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 
(1897) (applying just compensation rules to state takings cases). 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 5. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The 
Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, in COPY FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 43, 43–44 (Adam Thierer & Clyde 
Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2002). 
 6. James V. DeLong, Defending Intellectual Property, in COPY FIGHTS: THE 
FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE,  supra note 5, at 17. 
 7. Adam Mossoff, Locke’s Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 155, 155–56 
(2002).  For Mossoff’s views on the natural law elements in the law of patents, see Adam 
Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 1255 (2001). 
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Thus, Tom Bell, a devoted natural rights Lockean, writes, acerbically: 
“More pointedly, copyright and patent protection contradicts Locke’s 
justification of property.  By invoking state power, a copyright or patent 
owner can impose prior restraint, fines, imprisonment, and confiscation 
on those engaged in peaceful expression and the quiet enjoyment of their 
tangible property.”8  Evidently, this sentiment is not confined solely to 
those who come from communitarian or New Deal traditions, and who 
inherently have some uneasiness about the growth and expansion of 
intellectual property.  There is also a strong undercurrent of discontent 
about the protection of intellectual property interests among those who 
purport to treat individual freedom as the highest good.  The free 
software and the free copyright models show that there is much that 
unites the anarcho-libertarian right with the socialist or anarcho-
libertarian left.9  Further, Lawrence Lessig and others have also echoed 
this sentiment with their calls for the recognition and promotion of the 
“creative commons.”10
The modern position thus seeks to place liberty in opposition to 
property and thereby to dissolve the bonds that in ordinary thought link 
the two together.  I think that this effort to split the traditional alliance 
should be rejected, but should be rejected by arguments following a 
route that calls into question much of Locke’s labor theory of value.  In 
this context, labor represents a form of liberty because it is a form of 
individual conduct that purports to establish the link between a particular 
individual and some particular resource, tangible or intangible. 
In order to explore the nature of this tension as it applies to copyright, 
it is critical to understand how it plays out in connection with ordinary 
forms of property as well.  Part I of this Article, therefore, is an examination 
of the tension between liberty and property within the natural law 
tradition of Locke.  It should be noted, however, that Locke had little or 
nothing to say about intellectual property as such.  Once this basic 
understanding of the Lockean tradition is explicated, it becomes possible 
 8. Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in COPY 
FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 
5, at 1, 4. 
 9. See DeLong, supra note 6, at 17–18 (noting the overlap). 
 10. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 86–99 (2001) (worrying about the erosion of the intellectual 
commons); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 
106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996) (expressing concern with the impact of regimes of exclusive 
rights on democratic processes). 




in the second portion of the Article to examine how the same tension 
between liberty and property plays out in connection with copyright, 
and, by implication, other forms of intellectual property.  In the end, it is 
largely proper to yoke together liberty and property, as has been done by 
our classical liberal forebears.  However, the analytical path to achieving 
this result is far more tortuous than may appear at first reading. 
Many of the people who oppose copyright protection do so because 
they think that intellectual property rights flunk where tangible property 
rights succeed.  Namely, they argue that this failure is the result of the 
Lockean theory that has, as its essential justification for property rights, 
the three following steps: “1) Because a creator owns himself, 2) he 
owns his labor and, thus, 3) those intellectual properties with which, by 
dint of his creative acts, he mixes his labor.”11  Yet it is just here that the 
argument falters.  The Lockean syllogism does not take into account any 
system of property rights of the sort that Locke himself envisioned, 
either in one’s self or in tangible externals.  Rather, it becomes necessary 
to recast this theory in more consequentialist terms.  Once that is done, 
the gulf between property rights in tangibles and property rights in 
intangibles is far narrower than these theorists believe.  The set of 
justifications used in the former carries over to the latter.  The only 
question that remains is how the differences in the nature of the 
resources in question, whether copyright or patent (an issue that arises as 
well with tangible forms of property) require a distinctive configuration 
of property rights in the appropriate area. 
Therefore, we may have some justification for the limited terms of 
both patents and copyrights, and for their sharply different lengths.  
Further, we may understand the reasons for a privilege of fair use in 
copyright, but not in patent.  But in thinking of these differences, we 
should not forget the close parallels between actions for trespass and 
those for infringement, or for the use of damages and injunctions in both 
these areas.  Intellectual property rights rest on some plausible but not 
infallible assumptions; however, so do property rights in land and water.  
Once we lay out the differences, ironically, we can understand the 
theoretical unity that cuts across these various areas.  In accordance with 
this general plan, Part I of this Article examines the natural law 
justifications for property in one’s own person and in tangible objects.  
Part II of this Article carries the analysis over to the law of copyright. 
 11. Bell, supra note 8, at 3. 
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I.  LIBERTY, LABOR, AND AUTONOMY 
A.  Labor 
The starting point for the justification of tangible property is Locke’s 
famous statement that reads: “Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, 
be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: 
this nobody has any right to but himself.  The labour of his body, and the 
work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”12  Here, of course, the 
point is treated as a departure from the common pool norm for all that 
follows in his system.  The most important deviations are the rules that 
speak about the expenditure of labor as a means to acquire private 
property by mixing one’s labor with land or other external objects, which 
are owned in common.13  However, this theory is subject to a wide range 
of important objections as it relates to liberty, property, and their 
intersection.  Many of these objections bear on the question of whether 
we should recognize property rights in general, or copyright in particular. 
At the starting point, Locke’s theory does not read like a paean to 
utilitarianism in particular or any species of consequentialism in general.  
Ironically, it does not appear to fall into the class of natural law theories 
that rest on some backward looking deontological claim, in which the 
question of right depends solely on all that has gone before, and not on 
those things that are likely to come afterwards.14  Nor is it clear that the 
claims can be conveniently slotted into theories of this sort.  The most 
obvious point of criticism is that there is quite literally nothing that 
anyone has ever done to deserve the creation of ownership rights in his 
own person.  Further, it does not matter what terms are used, whether 
autonomy or self-ownership—assuming that some differences ride on 
the choice of terminology.  The blunt truth is that these tangible things 
are gifts of nature, in the sense that no one has committed any form of 
labor to create them. 
The point receives its most forceful elaboration in the critiques that 
John Rawls has made of the claim that individuals own, or are otherwise 
entitled to their own (not normative, but descriptive—or so one assumes) 
 12. LOCKE, supra note 1, at ch. V, para. 27. 
 13. Id. (“Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, 
and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, 
and thereby makes it his property.”). 
 14. See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, Justice and Personal Desert, in DOING AND 
DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 55, 81 (1970). 




talents.  Rawls noted that it is morally arbitrary for any individual to be 
treated as the sole owner of his own talents because the determinants of 
their value lie at the random fortunes of birth and upbringing combined 
with the demand for these talents in some concrete social setting.15  The 
same set of talents can thus be awarded enormously in some settings, but 
not at all in others. 
We can explore this counterargument to Locke’s position on a number 
of grounds.  First, many of our most important endowments from good 
health to good character and intelligence do depend upon the luck of 
genetic lottery, many of which no legal system can correct.  For 
example, people born with fatal conditions, such as Tay-Sachs disease, 
will live short and unhappy lives no matter what form of income 
distribution is implemented in their favor.  However, the Make-A-Wish 
Foundation does marvelous work for young persons with fatal maladies.  
It does not equalize fortunes across individuals, but, at the same time, it 
would be a mistake to adopt the posture of genetic determinism to the 
exclusion of social factors.  Once we control for social factors, it seems 
indefensible to say, as a general matter, that across the board individuals’ 
successes and failures depend, in large measure, on circumstances beyond 
their control.  There are many people who are raised in adverse circumstances 
and achieve success in life because they have, by dint of their own labor, 
developed the character and skills needed to allow them to succeed in the 
general world.  By the same token, we all know many individuals who, as 
children, enjoyed every advantage of family and fortune only to make a 
mess of their own lives.  It takes a good deal of confidence to believe that 
we have a strong knowledge of the determinants of individual success. 
The Rawlsian response could come in the form of a regression of the 
sort that claims these personal virtues are derivative in large measure on 
the labor, care, and comfort supplied by parents, often at great sacrifice 
to themselves.  These individuals might have some claim of moral desert 
in virtue of what they have supplied to their children.  They have indeed 
engaged in activities that qualify under some “desert theory,” looking 
backward to their past actions.  But so what?  If they choose to make 
gifts of services to their children, why cannot they transfer the fruits of 
their labor to their children in the same way that they leave them a share 
of stock or a family keepsake?  Perhaps the answer lies in the idea that 
 15. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74 (1971). 
Within the limits allowed by the background arrangements, distributive shares 
are decided by the outcome of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary 
from a moral perspective. . . .  Furthermore, the principle of fair opportunity 
can be only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as the institution of the 
family exists. 
Id. 
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we do not allow individuals to make gifts of what they have created, 
even to their loved ones.  There is a long tradition of propertied individuals, 
from Adam Smith to George Soros and Warren Buffet, who are in favor 
of keeping the estate tax.16  If this is correct, the argument has shifted, at 
least in part, from justice in the acquisition of liberty and property to 
justice in transfer.  The level of control that the state (that is, other 
people) exercises over each individual becomes ever more extensive.  If 
people do not own their own talents, they cannot transfer the fruits of 
their labor to anyone else either, or so it would appear. 
The strongest opposition to the idea that individuals do not deserve to 
own their own labor comes, however, from the following simple 
question: If I do not deserve the fruits of my labor, genetic endowments, 
and parental assistance, then who does?  If these elements are regarded 
as insufficient to establish a claim that each person owns his own labor 
and the fruits thereof, pursuant to a desert theory, they are surely not 
sufficient in any form or combination to allow any other person to claim 
those ownership rights in my labor.  Reciprocally, I cannot claim ownership 
rights of any sort in their labor.  After all, what possible desert do we 
have in the labor of others to which we have contributed nothing of any 
sort?  Therefore, the rejection of the Lockean claim on individual self-
ownership cannot be read as an argument that it fails the criterion of 
desert, where the implicit subtext is that some other unspecified 
allocation passes that test.  Quite the contrary, if the Lockean theory fails 
because it does not meet the standard of desert, then no other desert-
based allocation is possible.  Nor should we think otherwise.  Nature (in 
the literal sense) has provided some freebies for us all.  So long as there 
are unearned elements, it is not possible for all things of value to be 
earned under any version of the desert theory.  The idea of desert 
becomes a siren and a sink hole.  We have to look elsewhere to justify 
any theory of property, private or common. 
Unfortunately, this exacting use of the desert standard comes at a real 
cost because it drives a wedge between the everyday uses of the term 
“desert” and its philosophical deconstruction.  “I deserved to get into 
college, obtain a job, win a prize, or indeed anything else in the world” 
is now to be treated as an otiose statement by individuals who just do not 
get the moral arbitrariness that clouds their ostensible personal 
 16. Sam Fleischacker, Why Capitalists Should Like Estate Taxes, at http://dir.salon. 
com/politics/feature/2001/02/15/estate_tax/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2005) (noting 
long line of liberal thinkers who supported the estate tax). 




achievements.  Further, these critics leave completely undetermined just 
who should get the benefit of all the following elements that in 
combination are insufficient to justify a claim on desert: genetic 
endowment, individual efforts, and parental instruction and concern. 
There is a different way to look at the situation, which I think corresponds 
much more faithfully to ordinary sensibilities.  No one doubts that the 
success in any given venture depends on some combination of individual 
effort and plain old ordinary luck.  Raoul Berger worked on an obscure 
history of impeachment, and lo and behold the Nixon impeachment 
loomed large just after the book was published.17  The book’s success was a 
combination of luck and skill.  However, no one in ordinary discourse 
thinks that he has to abandon the extra royalties that he obtained from 
the exceptional sales, especially to some undifferentiated group of individuals 
who could not be asked to contribute a dime if the book flopped totally 
from indifference.  Our social attitude, therefore, is that any individual 
who contributes the labor to a particular project gets to keep the gains 
(subject, of course, to the contractual claims of others who joined with 
him in the project) even if these result in some portion from pure, old-
fashioned luck.18
The point that we make here is simply the following: the usual 
skepticism about desert establishes indubitably that no one can make out 
a claim that one hundred percent of any development is due to individual 
effort.  It therefore follows that society allocates the output, subject to 
contractual claims to the individuals who contribute the lion’s share of 
the material.  In so doing, we reject any claim that the level of entitlement 
has to be proportional in some sense to the amount of effort that has 
been put into business.  This proportionality cannot be satisfied even in 
robust competitive markets, which, after all, still allow—and to an Austrian, 
indeed encourage—supracompetitive returns, at least in the short run, to 
those individuals able enough to create or occupy a new market niche.19
At this point, the argument may well veer to the consequentialist side 
of the line.  Let there be no clear claim of desert that covers the full 
amount of the gain, then the issue arises—how ought that unearned gain 
be divided?  The problem here is the inescapable question of joint 
creation.  To assign the gain to people that had nothing to do with its 
creation shortchanges the original owner.  To assign it to the creator 
allows him to keep the advantages of luck; yet by the same token it does 
not permit him to trench on the labor of any other individual. 
 17. RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1974). 
 18. For my defense of this point, see Richard A. Epstein, Luck, 6 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 17 (1988). 
 19. For an explanation of how other factors intrude, see John Christman, 
Entrepreneurs, Profits, and Deserving Market Shares, 6 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 1 (1988). 
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The great temptation here is to seek some form of apportionment, but 
that task is more easily said than done.  To claim that some fraction of 
the gain should go to other people (say, in the form of a progressive tax 
on income) does not decide which individuals should be entitled to what 
share.  For example, should there be a special credit for those who have 
taken care of the person in his formative years, and, if so, should it be 
above any market wage that they might have received for their efforts?  
Or should it go to individuals in the same neighborhood, city, state, 
nation, or world?  The annoying fact of jurisdictional boundaries between 
nations could not slow down any cosmopolitan urge, at least at the moral 
plane on which it is thus far conducted. 
At the practical level, two points are salient.  First, this particular 
exercise has to be undertaken not only for this or that claimant, but also 
for everyone who has ever received anything for his labor.  Second, we 
cannot discharge this obligation by simply relying on some approximate 
test of income (with all its own problems of bunching and valuation) 
because there is absolutely nothing that says that individuals with the 
same levels of (earned or investment) income have benefited from the 
same level of luck.  In sum, the effort to isolate proportionate contributions 
from luck and from effort falls apart because of the inability to conduct 
sensible measurements over countless individuals for countless periods.  
It would be so defective that it is in the long-run interest of everyone to 
abandon any effort to isolate and reallocate the unearned increment (or 
decrement) that attaches to human labor.  Therefore, a rough and ready 
rule that follows the naïve sense of desert works better in practice than 
any overt system that seeks to divert wealth to other individuals, who are 
less deserving than the person whose labor created the wealth in 
question within the rules of the game.  Hitmen need not apply for a slice 
of the pie they did not create. 
At this point we can start to see the connection between the traditional 
natural appeal to theories of desert that rely on the labor theory of value, 
and the consequentialist situation that seeks, as I would have it, to create 
rules that in the long run create win-win situations—call these Pareto 
improvements—for the vast run of the population.  Each of us, ex ante, 
is better off waiving any inchoate claims against the labor of others on 
condition that they waive their claims in return.  The purpose of this massive 
renunciation of weak class claims is not to guarantee some perfect 
allocation of the goods of the universe.  It is the more mundane task to 
identify at low cost clear owners of labor so as to assure the security of 




investment and exchange that promotes long-term productive wealth. 
It is not an accident that those who accept the self-ownership of 
individual labor tend to be strong devotees of the market system.  They 
do so to avoid what they see the deleterious effects that arise from any 
system that is blind to self-interest and purports to operate on the 
following principle: “from each according to his ability, to each according 
to his need.”  It is only those who remain mired in philosophical doubt 
that see the ambiguities over desert as yet another nail in the coffin of 
market capitalism.20  Engaging in a case-by-case examination of the 
determinants of desert lets philosophical doubt sow administrative 
confusion in the countless daily practical decisions.  At this point, it is 
best to go back to an indirect form of consequentialism with roots in the 
earlier work of David Hume,21 who counseled against judging the 
soundness of social institutions by the way in which they play out in 
some individual case.  These roots also appear in the earlier writings of 
John Rawls, who gave consequentialist judgments a larger role in 
evaluating social institutions, rather than looking solely at individual 
cases.22  For the sound operation of the legal and social system, we must 
understand why the larger practices make sense over the broad domain 
of cases, such that we can formulate a general rule that is not exposed to 
constant counter attack on a case-by-case basis. 
B.  Property 
On balance, there is sufficient reason to accept the general proposition 
that all individuals have exclusive rights to their own labor, at least as an 
initial presumption.  The next question that needs to be asked is how this 
carries over to the case for individual ownership of property?  Here 
again, the most common form of the philosophical argument stems from 
Locke.  Locke saw the initial position as an uneasy mixture of individual 
ownership of one’s own labor and the fruits thereof, and common 
ownership of the natural resources found in the world, which, on his 
account, God had given to all men in common.23  But from the outset his 
 20. See, e.g., Christman, supra note 19, at 16 (“The relevance of this [rejection of 
moral desert in labor], if nothing else, consists in dislodging another pillar in the already 
shaky moral foundations of free market capitalism.”). 
 21. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 502 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1740) (“Justice, in her decisions, never regards the fitness or 
unfitness of objects to particular persons, but conducts herself by more extensive views.”). 
 22. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 3–5 (1955) (noting 
that it is sound to be a retributivist in cases of individual criminal offenses, even if it is 
important at the system level to understand the consequentialist (that is deterrence) 
justifications for various forms of punishment). 
 23. LOCKE, supra note 1, at ch. V, para. 26. 
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account runs into a parallel difficulty raised in connection with the 
individual ownership of one’s labor: How does one account for the 
unearned increment that goes to each individual who has by his labor 
taken something out of the common? 
Here there are several ways in which to attack this question.  One 
quick dismissal is based on a terminological objection.  It is not possible 
to mix labor with property, so that Locke’s argument fails as a 
misguided metaphor.  This position is taken by Jeremy Waldron, who 
writes that the entire enterprise fails at this basic level.  Most notably he 
contends: Individual A mixes his labour with object O seems to involve 
some sort of category mistake.  Surely the only things that can be mixed 
with objects are other objects.  But labour consists of actions not objects.  
How can a series of actions be mixed with a physical object?24
Yet that impossibility takes place all the time.  In ordinary business 
transactions, it is common for one person to contribute labor, and another to 
contribute capital to a joint enterprise.  The mixing of labor and property 
can also happen by inadvertence or mistake.  As I shall discuss later, the 
Roman Law and common law doctrines of merger all took as a common 
case the situation in which the labor of A applied to an object that was 
owned by B.  The situation is common enough that one needs a set of 
rules to analyze it, which could not be done if the entire question of 
sorting out the relative contributions made no sense at all. 
The real objections to this position must be more substantive.  The first 
objection stems from the fact that some portion of the problem lies in 
Locke’s specification of the initial ownership position with respect to 
natural resources.  Most concretely, he gives no account as to which 
resources should be regarded as owned in common, and if so, why.  In 
this regard, Locke is surely at odds with much of both the Roman and 
the common law tradition.  It is instructive that Justinian’s Institutes begins 
its discussion of property with a compilation of those natural resources 
that are indeed owned in common—the air, the water, and, in the most 
complex form, the beach.25  But it is equally clear that Locke was not 
sensitive to the consequences that attach to common ownership.  To be 
sure, he deals with the question of water briefly in his essay, but in 
 24. Jeremy Waldron, Two Worries About Mixing One’s Labour, 33 PHIL Q. 37, 40 
(1983).  This argument was brought to my attention in Mossoff, supra note 7, at 158, 
who criticizes the point on other grounds. 
 25. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 78 (photo. reprint 2002 Gaunt, Inc.) (J.T. Abdy 
& Bryan Walker trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1876). 




general does not understand how the system of property rights works.  
At one point he observes as follows: “Though the water running in the 
fountain be every one’s, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his 
only who drew it out?”26
But this contention misses the point.  Regimes of common ownership 
contain complex bars against the creation of private property by capture 
or occupation.  It may well be that individuals can draw some water out 
of the river, but they could never claim the river as their own, by adding 
to it labor that allows them to separate it from others.  The river is kept 
as a common in order to preserve its “going concern” value for 
transportation, fishing, recreation and the like.27
Likewise, Locke does no better when he writes that “[n]obody could 
think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a 
good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to 
quench his thirst.”28  The question is not what the adverse consequence 
of one large draught would be, but rather the systematic consequences of 
multiple draughts, or worse, diversions from the original river for 
irrigation and otherwise—he ignores the problem of the common pool in 
his statement of the issue.29  Yet water law prevents individuals from 
taking as much water out of the common as they can. 
It follows, therefore, that the initial image of land, things, or animals 
as common property does not augur well for a system of individual 
ownership.  Thus, it is instructive to note that the legal system in dealing 
with the questions of the rights to occupation (of land) and capture (of 
animals) does not start with the image of these resources as res 
communes.  Rather, it treats each of them as a res nullius—a thing 
owned by no one—so that the occupation of land or taking of a chattel 
does not take any interest held by others in common. 
To appreciate the importance of not treating tangible property as 
communal in the initial position, it is useful to consider the law’s 
treatment of those situations in which one person takes the land or 
chattels that another owns, and converts them to his own use.  The 
classical legal texts on this subject all start with cases similar to the 
following example: I own a slab of marble that you take by mistake, 
from which you now carve a statue.  Who owns the statue?  What rights, 
if any, inhere in the nonowner?  The answers to these cases are not easy, 
but for all their differences and variations, they never result in the 
 26. LOCKE, supra note 1, at ch. V, para. 29. 
 27. See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970, 
979 (1985) (noting resource loss from separation of certain resources into private hands). 
 28. LOCKE, supra note 1, at ch. V, para. 33. 
 29. See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) 
(noting the dangers of systematic overconsumption of common resources). 
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Lockean solution that vests the entire ownership in the party whose labor 
improved material things owned by one or more other persons. 
For these examples, it is only possible to indicate some of the key 
elements.  The classical law often allows the person with the distinctive 
attribute (the sculptor) to keep the thing, while giving a substitute slab 
(or its cash equivalent) to the owner of the alternative input.  However, 
partnerships are never created between the two parties—relationships of 
trust do not work well between individuals who are brought together by 
happenstance and chance.  In essence, a rule of forced exchanges 
dominates the matter, as the party who gets the thing is required to pay 
just compensation to the party who is required to surrender his interest in 
the thing, usually measured by its unimproved value.30
Here we can convert these problems into the Lockean problem by 
assuming that the thing that one person takes is in fact owned by a group 
of other individuals in common.  How then does the logic of the private 
law apply to this situation?  The first cut into the problem is to distinguish 
between those people who take innocently from those who take in bad 
faith.  The definition of an innocent party is not someone who commits 
no wrong.  Rather, it is a person who takes and converts property out of 
justifiable ignorance of the property holdings of another individual.  For 
instance, one who takes gold from another’s property, believing it to be 
his own property, is considered an innocent converter.31  The bad faith 
converter is, in contrast, one who takes with knowledge of the ownership 
claims of others. 
In dealing with innocent conversions, we have the allocations noted 
above.  The converter, therefore, should be treated as an owner of the 
segment taken, but he does not get the free and clear title that Locke 
attributes to him.  In the first place, if he has taken more than his pro rata 
share, he must accept a lien on his property for the excess.  Also, he 
must surrender all claims to the property that remains in the common.  
Yet no one thinks that the person who captures an animal or occupies 
land thereby suffers a diminution in his right to use rivers or breathe air.  
The model of partition and severance, which is sometimes used in cases 
of common property, does not explain how any individual owner gets 
title free and clear by taking something from the common.  That model 
also assumes that the person who takes property is an innocent 
 30. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 
116–18 (1995) (defending the efficiency of the Roman rules). 
 31. See, e.g., Maye v. Yappen, 23 Cal. 306, 310–12 (1863). 




converter.  This assumption could only be correct if the rules in question 
allowed the universal right of separation, which is the very point in 
issue.  One way to make that claim is to depart from the usual private 
law rules and to note that the claims of necessity allow the separation in 
question to take place, which, of course, is the line that Locke takes. 
The case for private property is still weaker if we treat all individuals 
as bad faith converters of common resources because they know their 
legal status.  The bad faith converter is an all-around loser.  First, he 
does not get to keep the thing.  Also, when he returns it to its (common) 
owners, he does not receive any compensation for the labor or materials 
that he has added to the thing that he has taken.  If, therefore, we follow 
the private law analogies on this subject, treating all natural resources as 
though they were owned in common has the unpalatable consequence 
that all individuals, who (in bad faith) convert common property to 
private use, have to return what they have taken without compensation 
for their improvements.  From there it is but an easy step to reach the 
conclusion that they can be enjoined from the taking, just as they could 
be enjoined from damming up the river, or blocking access to the ocean.  
Both of these examples are indeed common property, in law as well as in 
philosophy.  This outcome is not the set of results that Locke had hoped 
to achieve by mixing private labor with commonly owned natural 
resources.  However, it follows inexorably from his description of the 
initial ownership position. 
These problems are sidestepped by treating land, chattels, and wild 
animals as res nullius.32  The shift in terminology has important 
consequences with respect to the aforementioned merger problem.  It is 
no longer possible to say that the appropriation of an unowned object 
results in the conversion of the interest of any other person.  Hence, the 
individual is now entitled to take as much as he pleases of these 
resources, and does not have to worry about the consequences that are 
imposed on other individuals.  In fact, this is the classical Roman and 
common law tradition. 
The adoption of this position has with it several powerful advantages.  
For one thing, it allows the use of a quick and reliable test to identify the 
owner of each object, which in turn allows for orderly use, 
recombination, and disposition of natural resources.  The number of 
cases in which complications over hot pursuit will arise is small, 
notwithstanding the deserved celebrity of Pierson v. Post.33  In addition, 
 32. See, e.g., INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW BY GAIUS §§ 66–69 165 (photo. reprint 
W.M. Gaunt & Sons, Inc. 1991) (Edward Poste trans., 1904); INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, 
supra note 25, at 78. 
 33. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).  The now celebrated dispute between 
Popov and Hayashi over the capture of Barry Bonds’s record-breaking home run ball 
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this rule prevents giant-sized holdout problems from taking place, the 
inevitable result if universal consent was needed to remove something 
from the commons.  It is just that nightmarish spectacle that drove Locke 
to opt for his labor theory of value.34  However, he did so at a cost to his 
overall theory.  The basic intuition behind the labor theory is that the 
huge bulk of the value of any given asset derives from the productive 
labor added to it, which is probably all that he meant when he used the 
metaphor “mixing” labor with natural resources.35  This analogy may be 
true of stony farmland, but it is obviously not true of the abundant 
Arabian oil. 
In addition, Locke also had to cope with the antecedent difficulty of 
how any individual came to have the right to add labor to objects in the 
first place, if he did not own them by initial possession.  For instance, 
acorns must have received their owner when they were picked up, and 
not at some later point when they were carried home, boiled, or eaten.36  
It is important to see how this potent example reverses the sequence of 
the labor theory of value.  After the fact when the item is owned and 
improved, it is tempting to say that ownership should be complete 
because of the enormous labor that the owner expended on the object.  
However, the real task is to adopt a rule that requires as little labor as 
possible in order to perfect title to the acorn, so that the owner can be 
confident that he will be able, by holding on to the external object, to 
keep the benefit of the labor that he creates.  To take the other position 
has perverse consequences.  If ownership were acquired, for example, 
only when the acorns were boiled, this legal rule would foreclose the 
possibility of storing the acorns for later use, since title to them would 
still be precarious.  Likewise, land would have to be developed (to the 
dismay of conservationists) for title to be perfected.  The point of the 
mixing is to allow the addition of labor to natural resources to increase 
their value, and that objective is achieved by moving the point of 
acquisition forward to the earliest possible moment.  Looking at the 
acorn will not do it; hot pursuit might well, and capture surely does.  
Locke in a sense has it all backwards. 
counts as one such case, but only because the San Francisco Giants did not stipulate the 
rule that governed its capture.  See Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, 
at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). 
 34. LOCKE, supra note 1, at ch. V, para. 28. 
 35. See Mossoff, supra note 7, at 158–59 (defending the metaphor). 
 36. LOCKE, supra note 1, at ch. V, para. 28. 




The purpose of the first possession rule is to allow for the easy 
acquisition of material things so that their owners will be in a position to 
expend labor on them.  It makes no sense to demand the huge 
expenditures of labor as a precondition of ownership.  Locke only 
alludes to that erroneous view because he wants to make the pre-existing 
value of natural resources small relative to the labor used to improve 
them.37  That might be true in some cases, but not for all.  Land that 
needs to be cleared for agriculture requires much hard labor, but land in 
which deep pools of oil are oozing out of the surface requires much less.  
I have little doubt that Adam Mossoff is correct when he reads the word 
“mixing” as a metaphor for productive labor.  But the more telling 
objection is that this recasting of Locke’s view does not save his theory, 
even against the example of the acorns.  In contrast, the correct and 
simpler point is that taking something from the commons and holding it 
just marks off what one person has against another in a cheap way that 
gives notice, as possession often does, to the rest of the world as to the 
existence of the prior claim. 
The movement from res communes to res nullius escapes the serious 
objections to the theory of combining labor with external objects, but 
standing alone it does not answer all questions that the philosophical 
skeptic can raise relating to the troubled status of private property.  One 
line of objection is that this definition of property remains necessarily 
inconsistent with the broad definition of liberty that is part of the 
endowment of each person—the precise claim that is urged with 
copyright.  That liberty includes the ability to go where one wills, and 
this right of movement is necessarily limited by the creation of any 
system of private property, which converts free movement into trespass.  
The point has been argued extensively by Robert Lee Hale and G.A. 
Cohen,38 who both see the creation of any law of trespass as a limitation, 
often unjustified, on individual freedom. 
The blunt truth is that this challenge cannot be turned aside by some 
pat analytical response.  It is conceivable that we could treat land as a 
commons-like water and thus prevent its permanent occupation by any 
one.  Early nomadic tribes followed just this pattern.  However, the 
reason we are not still in this primitive state are the enormous advantages 
from the privatization of land, without which no one would invest in 
permanent improvements at his own expense that could be snatched 
 37. LOCKE, supra note 1, at ch. V, para. 43. 
 38. Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive 
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); G. A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND 
EQUALITY 55–56 (1995).  I have critiqued their positions at length in RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 110–
14, 132–38 (2003). 
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away by anyone.  The short answer to the question of why the law confers 
private ownership of these resources is the same as it is for labor.  It 
works to the long-term advantage of everyone behind a veil of ignorance, so 
that these limitations on liberty are justified by the gains that they yield 
from the social ownership of property.  The losses that people suffer 
from exclusion are small compared to the gains that they get both from 
their ability to privatize their labor and from their ability to enter into 
trade with those who have engaged in privatization.  It is for this reason 
that Blackstone, in dealing with the first possession rule, noted that it 
was the product of the “implied assent” of mankind.39  Clearly, the term 
“implied assent” is again asked to do too much work.  From a modern 
perspective, he is really saying that from a social vantage point, the 
creation of private property through acquisition is a clear Pareto 
improvement over a world in which each person enjoys (as per some 
commons) a blockade position against everyone else.  Once again, we 
get a form of closet consequentialism in the articulation of our legal 
rules, which came out into the open with Harold Demsetz’s short famous 
article on the functional justifications for the law of property.40
All this, however, is not that transparent, for even if one adopts the 
first possession rule, one has to determine what counts as “possession” 
within the meaning of the rule.  Here there is a largely forgotten 
literature today that asks why, or how, someone keeps possession of a 
thing after he no longer grasps it in his hand.41  In some cases, it makes 
sense to allow possessory interests of limited duration only.  For 
example, the short-term use is preferred in the case of those who make 
temporary huts on public beaches.  The limited use is consistent with 
keeping the beach open for transportation in the way in which permanent 
structures are not.42  But once we leave the commons, the situation is 
usually otherwise.  As Bentham described in one of his famous passages, 
the situation of limited property rights is most unfortunate from just 
about everyone’s vantage point because of the precarious nature of the 
 39. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *8. 
 40. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 
(1967). 
 41. For the Roman treatment on this subject, see JOSHUA GETZLER, ROMAN IDEAS 
OF LANDOWNERSHIP, IN LAND LAW THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES (Susan Bright & John 
Dewar eds., 1998); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 107–14 
(1962).  For the common law approach, see FREDERICK POLLOCK & ROBERT SAMUEL 
WRIGHT, AN ESSAY ON POSSESSION IN THE COMMON LAW (1888). 
 42. See INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 25, at 180. 




possession that is so created. 
There have been from the beginning, and there always will be, circumstances in 
which a man may secure himself, by his own means, in the enjoyment of certain 
things.  But the catalogue of these cases is very limited.  The savage who has 
killed a deer may hope to keep it for himself, so long as his cave is 
undiscovered; so long as he watches to defend it, and is stronger than his rivals; 
but that is all.  How miserable and precarious is such a possession!  If we 
suppose the least agreement among savages to respect the acquisitions of each 
other, we see the introduction of a principle to which no name can be given but 
that of law.  A feeble and momentary expectation may result from time to time 
from circumstances purely physical; but a strong and permanent expectation can 
result only from law.  That which, in the natural state, was an almost invisible 
thread, in the social state becomes a cable. 
   Property and law are born together, and die together.  Before laws were made 
there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.43
In one sense it is clear that Bentham sought to set himself up in 
opposition to Blackstone, but in fact the two make exactly the same 
point.44  The theories of natural rights in property cannot stand because 
the power of the state is needed to extend possession beyond the situations 
of actual control.  The state that creates property can (by implication) 
limit its extent at will.  But in fact Bentham’s passage only establishes 
what the natural lawyers, as Blackstone forcefully argued, had long 
thought to be the inescapable conclusion of their own system.  In Bentham’s 
choice of problems, the above passage exhibits a remarkable continuity 
of thought.  In fact, his example of the deer points in exactly the 
opposite direction of what he believed. Any culture could, should, and 
would develop this same norm in dealing with the property rights of its 
members.  The most primitive sense of possession only covers the actual 
grabbing and holding on to an object. 
Such a rule is manifestly inconvenient because it means that legal 
possession ceases when the possessor loses his grip on what is handled.  
Only by degrees is the term “possession” extended to cover those cases 
where the physical control is relaxed because of the intention to retain 
ownership.  The point is critical not only as a linguistic matter, but 
because of the simple truth that many standard Roman and common law 
remedies were keyed to possession—only the possessor had standing to 
bring the suit in question.  When, therefore, Bentham refers to “least 
agreement among savages,”45 his is simply an elegant way of restating 
the implied consent argument in Blackstone and others.  The rule that 
treats individuals as in what is sometimes termed “constructive” 
 43. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112–13 (C.K. Ogden ed., 
1931). 
 44. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at *3–4 (noting the inconvenience of the 
transient ownership). 
 45. See BENTHAM, supra note 43, at 112–13. 
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possession of things that they do not continue to literally possess in their 
hands created such an enormous Pareto improvement that no one could 
oppose it from behind the veil of ignorance.  Indeed, it is commonplace 
in both Roman and American law that the occupant of an estate need not 
prowl its boundaries to maintain a hold.  Rather, “suffice it that he enters 
some part of the estate, but with the intent and awareness that thereby he 
seeks to possess the estate to its utmost boundaries.”46  Nor is it hard to 
infer the intention to possess the entire estate.  Individuals with a 
modicum of self-interest will claim all that the law allows them to 
achieve through unilateral action. 
The last distinctive element of land is the rule that allows for acquisition 
of the surface to cover the rights to the earth (and minerals) below and 
the air above.  Land is not two-dimensional, but it is not practicable in 
any way to require individuals to expend huge resources in order to stake 
out claims.  Thus, we again encourage the private protection of some 
unearned increment because the key task of the system is to reduce the 
labor and complexity that is required to reduce natural things to private 
ownership.  A legal regime that requires individuals to expend labor that 
is equal in value to the property acquired reduces the value of the 
property to zero.  Any system that requires individuals to run through 
hoops in order to acquire these interests in property reduces their value 
pro tanto.  Again, from an ex ante perspective, it is in society’s best 
interest to have as few barriers to the creation of private ownership as 
possible, and not as many as could be imposed. 
In the end, therefore, any exploration of the rules that govern the 
acquisition of property have the same feel as those that deal with liberty.  
In both cases, there is an unearned increment of talent or wealth that is 
not deserved under some strong theory of individual moral desert.  That 
objection, however, carries little weight in the general case because, if 
true, it means that no one else could mount a claim based on desert 
either.  Therefore, the best solution is to develop some cheap rule that 
allows individuals to mark off property as their own as inexpensively as 
possible.  It is better that the unearned increment be held by someone, 
rather than it be lost in the morass of competition to acquire ownership.  
With both property and liberty there are limitations that may well make 
sense.  For example, one major issue is the common pool problem, 
which results in the overhunting of certain forms of wild animals that, at 
 46. DIG. 41.2.3.1 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 54). 




common law, are subject to unlimited capture.  But these limitations are 
neither designed to set liberty in opposition to private property, nor to 
challenge the legitimacy of either.  Rather, they are designed to continue 
the process of creating long-term social improvement by sensible 
incremental modifications of a property rights system.  These issues are 
not without importance for the area of copyright, where they help to 
frame so much of the current debate over the subject. 
II.  LIBERTY AND PROPERTY—THE SECOND CUT IN COPYRIGHT 
The second part of this Article is intended to show how the tension 
between liberty and property plays itself out in connection with the law 
of copyright.  In most settings, the common understanding is that the 
case for the creation of copyrights is, if anything, weaker than it is for 
ordinary forms of property.  The individual act of acquisition of land or 
chattel means that the general system of self-help allows individuals to 
both define and protect their individual property rights.  It is easy to 
imagine how a system of property rights is natural, in the sense that it 
does not take any state agency to mark off the rights in question.  In this 
view, the rights come from acquisition, and the sole function of the state 
is to provide protection for them with the use of public force 
administered by an executive branch and enforced by a set of impartial 
judges.  We can leave the legislature all to one side. 
That solution, however, is not possible with copyright.  While metes and 
bounds could work for land, and simple possession—for most chattels, 
the only way to protect copyrights is through the creation of some 
system that allows for them to be posted and recorded, and that takes 
some form of state power.  The demands on self-help are far greater for 
copyright than for real estate.  With copyrights, one quite literally has to 
commit a trespass against another in order to make good on the claim.  It 
is for this reason that the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that 
there is no natural right to property, given that it is, in a sense that 
Bentham would approve, the creature of the state, for which it ascribes 
overtly utilitarian justifications.47  The view becomes more credible that 
copyrights come from the top-down even if rights in land and chattels 
come from the bottom-up.  Thus, Tom Bell argues that copyrights 
should be denounced because they are totally creatures of the state.48
In another sense, the case for treating copyright and other forms of 
intellectual property under the natural rights framework is more 
attractive than this brief account suggests.  The initial stumbling blocks 
 47. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–10 (1966). 
 48. See Bell, supra note 8, at 3. 
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for treating copyright with the natural rights theory of property are the 
following two: Does a person own his own labor, and what happens 
when that labor is mixed with resources that are owned in common?  On 
the first question there is nothing about the copyright situation that 
deviates from other uses of labor.  The general argument in favor of 
strong protection of rights in one’s labor carry through against any 
claims that some theory of desert pulls us in the opposite direction.  It 
does not seem correct to say, as Tom Bell has written, that the labor-
desert justification of property gives a creator a clear title only to the 
particular tangible item in which he fixes his creativity—“not to some 
intangible wisp of the metaphysical realm.”49  We do have a system of 
nonwispy copyrights at the present.  While one might oppose their 
creation, the rights in question are capable of sale or licensing, are 
protected against confiscation and infringement, and are capable of 
valuation.  One might as well give the same dubious description to 
ordinary contract rights, for which the government cannot take an 
assignment unless it is prepared to compensate the assignor for the loss 
of his entitlement. 
To be sure, Locke did not offer any explicit treatment one way or the 
other of intellectual property rights, which adds to his charm.  But it 
hardly follows that his theory has no implications for the area.  Indeed, 
the labor theory of acquisition seems, if anything, stronger here precisely 
because intellectual property does not require any form of mixing with 
tangible forms.  Rather, these types of property appear to be the result of 
pure labor, which the creator, therefore, cannot keep because first 
possession of a tangible object allows him only to protect the paper on 
which the draft is written, rather than the draft itself.  Yet by the same 
token, the author has not taken anything else out of the commons and so 
does not run into the joint contribution objections that undermine the 
power of the first possession rule for tangible objects.  The only function 
of legal intervention here is to protect that investment in labor without 
any expropriation.
In this regard, however, there is a second counterargument that must 
be met.  It may well be that individuals do not pull material things out of 
rivers and woods when they work, but they do depend on a cultural 
commons of sorts for their inspirations and ideas.  In light of this 
commons, it is possible to mount a desert-like attack on copyrights, as 
 49. Id. 




with other mental activity, by noting that all individuals are constantly 
subject to a wide range of external influences, which enrich their works.  
The argument thus goes that it is not possible to think that some 
unmediated and flawless market registers their intrinsic personal worth.  
Indeed, some believe the creation of the copyright monopoly is one of 
the factors that prevents the proportionate response of return to labor.50  
If that point were true with respect to the making of widgets, it is 
certainly true as well of the nameless author of the essay “Of Widgets,” 
whose success is parasitic on the inventors and fabricators of widgets.  
The information that is supplied depends on the contributions of large 
numbers of other individuals.  The “author” is deconstructed into a 
vessel through which countless forms of influences are poured.  Parental 
upbringing, education, literary influence, and the past recordation of 
popular events are all examples of these influences.  How much credit 
could we give to Charles Dickens if his portrait of Wilkins Macawber in 
David Copperfield is based on his father?  And how much if he has 
incorporated elements of the great writers of the past into his writing 
style without compensation or perhaps even acknowledgement? 
The answer to the specific challenge is the same as it is in the general 
case—confession and avoidance.  There is little question that all these 
influences come to bear on the individual author.  But by the same token, it 
is possible to locate in one person, or a small group of joint authors, the 
creative spark or hard effort that took these disparate influences and 
melded them into a coherent work, worthy of our attention.  The others 
with whom the creator works can protect themselves by contract.  The 
system of copyright ownership was right to fasten its attention on 
(undeconstructed) authors, as the Constitution so requires.51  It thereby 
gives the entire claim to the one person who has contributed the lion’s 
share to the finished product, with the precise intention of slighting the 
indirect contributions of other individuals to this product. 
Do we want to treat as an author any person who forbore from killing 
or maiming the author while engaged in his creative efforts?  Or even 
those who were the creative inspiration to the person who did the 
writing?  The constant emphasis of these indirect effects overlooks the 
simple point that the author of a copyrighted work contributes—dare we 
say in equal measure—back to the common pool by the creation of 
images that allow others to continue with their work as well.  Thus, these 
contributors get implicit in-kind compensation for their contributions, in 
 50. See, e.g., Christman, supra note 19, at 12. 
 51. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries” (emphasis added)). 
EPSTEIN 4/7/2005  10:09 AM 
[VOL. 42:  1, 2005]  Liberty versus Property? 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 23 
their ability to use the creator’s works for their own creations.  
Therefore, so long as we think that the copyright law gives sensible 
incentives for the creation of new works, there is no reason to think that 
every dime of revenue has to be earned in order for all of it to be 
allocated to the author.  Indeed in many cases, the monopoly element in 
the return is overstated because the exclusive rights often do not become 
economic monopolies, in light of the fierce competition for readers or 
listeners that is facilitated by the copyright law. 
This basic frame of argumentation also carries over to the clear 
conflict between copyright and freedom of speech, which, in its essential 
form, is analogous to the conflict between liberty of movement and the 
trespass laws.  Trespass law is useful for land only because of the 
network of public roads and waterways that allows for movement 
between various plots of private property.  Similarly, we have a common 
domain of ordinary speech and language that is outside the scope of the 
copyright law, which facilitates the creation of the writings that are 
properly subject to protection under the statute.  The legal monopoly 
conferred by a copyright or a patent need not translate itself into an 
economic monopoly so long as there are close substitutes, as there are 
for every new popular song that is released.  As one wag (I know not 
who) put it, property and monopoly are not different sides of the same 
coin.  They are the same side of the same coin.  We cannot decide that 
copyrights present any social risks unless we think that they make 
barriers against the creation of new works.  That risk, moreover, looks to 
me to be more critical to the patent law, especially with genetic 
materials, than it does to any song or musical work.  No one has to use 
any particular song or story for a particular project, but can draw on a 
rich culture, including items that have fallen out of copyright protection. 
In contrast, it is quite difficult to conduct research on breast cancer 
unless one has access to the BRAC-1 gene.  Getting the right rules for 
this area is a difficult task.  Everyone agrees that patent protection should be 
shorter than copyright protection.  Beyond that point, however, there are 
deep, perhaps unbridgeable, differences of opinion, between those, like 
myself, who think that the problem is well handled by traditional doctrines, 
and others who think, even more emphatically, quite the opposite.  The 
lost use involved is of little consequence for any dynamic development 
of the arts, which need not be the case in patents.  Copyright, of course, 
has implications for short-term use given that each song is still priced 
above marginal cost of production even in a competitive industry.  Yet 




again, there is no reason to think that some undifferentiated interest in 
liberty is so strong as to snuff out any creation of property rights. 
On balance, as with tangible objects, the pairing of liberty and 
property seems to survive, even if it does not exactly prosper.  One way 
to look at this element is to analyze the reception that copyright law has 
in connection with freedom of speech, where the constitutional doctrines 
in question are anything but moribund.  In this case, the usual judicial 
view of the subject is the opposite of that found in the Lockean literature 
already quoted.  Thus, for the Supreme Court, freedom of speech begins 
at the point that the delineation of copyright protection leaves off, and 
this idea flourishes in a world in which intermediate or strict scrutiny is 
very much the order of the day.52
One way to solve this problem is to argue that the issue is one of 
definitions: copyright infringement is a wrong so that it cannot be 
justified under the First Amendment.  However, to the serious analyst 
this counts as a form of question begging because the issue is in reality 
about whether Congress can create these rights at all.  At one level, that 
question seems otiose because of the explicit power to create copyrights 
found in Article I of the Constitution.  But by the same token, it could be 
argued that the First Amendment requires that one justify the creation of 
the regime with reference to its purpose of the advancement of the useful 
arts.  In the ordinary case, we could argue that this is indeed satisfied 
because the incentive gains from the creation of these exclusive rights 
justifies the restrictions on speech that are imposed. 
Even that inquiry, however, leaves open the further question of 
whether the balance of trade is sufficiently out of whack in some specific 
cases so that the balance has to be rethought or redrawn.  The most 
obvious point is whether the fair use privilege, as it relates to criticism 
and comment on literary works, is something that is required by the First 
Amendment, which I think ought to be the case, even if it is not at the 
present time.  But the issue comes up in other contexts as well, 
especially in relation to the duration of copyright protection, which 
under the Constitution has to be for limited times only.  This case is one 
in which the use of a constitutional phrase is far less preferable than the 
use of a number.  It is in contrast to the use of the twenty dollar figure in 
the Seventh Amendment, which was far less useful than no number at 
all.  The Constitution could have picked anything from one to one 
thousand years (or different terms for patents and copyrights).  This 
number would have been preferable because people would have known 
where they stood, and it would have avoided endless theorizing as to the 
 52. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545–
49 (1985). 
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purpose of so ill-formed a restriction.  As long as discounting is taken 
seriously, the value of the future life of a copyright could vary anywhere 
from 10 percent to 99.9 percent of the value of the use.  The vague 
constitutional provision gives no guidelines as to which of these 
extremes should be regarded as best. 
In the general analysis, the first contrast between copyrights and real 
property is that there is no obvious reason to limit the duration of rights 
in real property.53  The long period of ownership spurs development, but 
since only one person can farm at any time, it does little to crimp 
utilization at the back end.  With copyright, the possibility of multiple 
utilizations of the item, without exhaustion of its physical properties, 
allows for a realization of gain if the term is cut short.  This gain is not 
found in real property, and makes copyright unique.  But even here the 
point is not by any means decisive. 
The calls for permanent copyright protection (but rarely for permanent 
patent protection because of how technology overtakes invention) have 
been raised in many quarters—Samuel Clemens54 for one, and most 
recently by my redoubtable colleagues Professor William Landes and 
Judge Richard A. Posner.55  This argument recognizes the costs of 
exclusion but does not find them conclusive.56  The source of the 
uneasiness in their work is a concern about the possible deterioration of 
valuable properties when placed in the public domain, when no one can 
tend to them, as with intelligent brand management.  But there are 
arguments that cut the other way.  Therefore, public domain status 
should be regarded as a good because it has the real advantage of 
eliminating transaction costs associated with various licensing and sales 
arrangements, such as identifying holders of valid rights, negotiating 
deals, and the like.57  In addition, it eliminates the deadweight losses that 
always accompany monopoly pricing.58  The fact that any concerns with 
 53. For a discussion of the variation in property rights types, see Richard A. Epstein, 
Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803 (2001). 
 54. Samuel L. Clemens, Copyright in Perpetuity, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 109 (2002) 
(reprint of 1906 testimony before Congress on legislation that eventually became the 
Copyright Act of 1909). 
 55. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 518 (2003). 
 56. Id. at 475–84. 
 57. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 31–32 (2003). 
 58. Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003) 
(reviewing literature that argues for government purchase of private patent rights). 




public domain status cannot be dismissed at the general level is evident 
from the congressional mandate in the Bayh-Dole Act,59 which calls on 
private parties who receive government grants to earnestly consider 
whether to take out patents on the fruits of their research.  The great fear 
of this Act is that items that are left in the public domain will languish 
because any initial developer of the idea will be undercut by future 
imitators who can supply the same or similar products at a far lower price. 
The question one must ask is how do these things play out outside the 
patent field.  In this regard, it is imperative to distinguish sharply 
between the trade name, trademark, and right of publicity cases.  Strictly 
speaking, the branding exercise is at stake in the first two types of cases, 
and, in some instances, in the third type.  Socializing the name or mark 
makes it worthless for anything but decoration because it will fail in its 
function to relate the item branded back to a single source.  In the cases 
in which the right of publicity is used for the same purpose, it is subject 
to the same kind of rationale.  This rationale does not apply to those who 
wish to perform as Elvis Presley look-alikes, and a strong case exists for 
bifurcating the right and allowing the protection to be of indefinite 
duration, when used for purposes of identification or branding. 
With the copyright system, however, the emphasis is not on branding, 
but on performance, and here we do have extensive experience with 
materials that have fallen into the public domain.  There are countless, 
often perverse, versions of Shakespeare that are produced everywhere 
today.  The Shakespeare trust would probably not license some of these 
performances at all.  Further, the trust would charge a hefty fee for the 
standard performances that they did license, and could easily place tight 
restrictions on the choice of sets, designs, actors, and the like.  Anyone is 
hard pressed to believe that Shakespeare’s star has been dimmed by the 
calamities committed in his name, or that the world would be a better 
place if the obvious restrictions on use could be achieved with the 
blessing of the state.  For those copyrighted works (treatises and casebooks, 
alas, for example) that need revisions on three-year cycles to stay 
current, the duration of a copyright is of little consequence.  However, 
the duration issue only counts for the literary works that are immortal, 
and for these works, the original judgment that they be for terms is 
correct.  Further, the terms should be significantly shorter than the life 
plus fifty years that is contemplated for new works today. 
The question of duration is, of course, not only relevant to the 
 59. 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000).  For an exhaustive account of the history, see Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology 
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) (recounting 
up and down history of patents from government sponsored research). 
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situation for new patents.  It is most salient for the recent decision under 
the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) to lengthen the term of 
copyright protection for twenty years, both for new and existing 
patents.60  That statute was sustained by the Supreme Court in a careful 
decision of Justice Ginsburg, which paid too much homage to the 
rational basis test in reaching its decision.61  It now makes a real 
difference what approach is taken to the First Amendment issue.62  If the 
rule dogmatically holds that nothing that is protected by copyright law 
can offend the First Amendment, as the rational basis test can be easily 
read to imply, the CTEA is home free, for no one could have the 
temerity to dispute that it is a copyright statute.  However, the analysis 
takes a very different view if one asks whether or not there is some 
social justification for the statute in the sense that it offers gains to others 
that justify, perhaps to a standard of intermediate scrutiny, the restrictions 
that have been imposed. 
Starting from this perspective, the obvious challenge to the CTEA is 
that it is a giveaway of public domain property to private individuals for 
which the state receives nothing in return.  Under the rational basis 
standard, that giveaway could be justified for the reasons mentioned 
above, namely, that it facilitates the coherent management of the various 
brands in question.  The Mickey Mouse material might fall into this 
category in light of the consistent image that Disney has tried to project.  
This case raises an evident tension between the copyright protection that 
lapses and the trademark protection that is perpetual.  In other cases, 
such as that of the Gershwin estate, the brand management argument 
looks still weaker.  It is not as though the reputations of Mozart or 
Beethoven have suffered because their music is off copyright. 
If the level of constitutional scrutiny is ratcheted up, a different set of 
considerations surely prevails.  Once it is clear that the various 
copyrights fall into the public domain, it is uncertain why they should be 
given away for free, when they could be resold or licensed to anyone, 
including their original holders.  With this scenario, we could achieve 
whatever gains are available from brand management, but allow the state 
 60. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 
2827 (1998). 
 61. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  “The appeals court recognized that 
this Court has been similarly deferential to the judgment of Congress in the realm of 
copyright.”  Id. at 198. 
 62. See Richard A. Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term 
Extension Act, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 123, 148–56 (2003). 




to keep some portion of the proceeds through the sale arrangement in 
ways that honor a type of reverse eminent domain clause: nor shall 
public property be given for private use, without just compensation.63  
The point is that even if the First Amendment is not offended by this 
giveaway, some version of the public trust doctrine is.  Now is not the 
time to speak about the uneasy constitutional pedigree of this doctrine at 
the federal level.  It is, however, appropriate to stress that even as a 
matter of sound policy, the privatization of copyrighted material could 
be handled by exchange instead of gift. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, when we look at the situation with respect to copyright, it 
seems clear that the peculiar nature of the rights in question justifies 
rules that allow for limited duration and fair use, and perhaps some other 
restrictions.  But, as such, they do not alter the basic tension that exists 
between liberty and property in the case of labor or natural resources.  It 
is easy to conclude that the foundations of intellectual property law in 
general and copyright in particular are shaky if it is assumed that the 
foundations for individual autonomy and private property are secure on 
some unadorned version of natural law theory that relies more on self-
evidence and less on functional advantage.  But for years now, my own 
private campaign has been to insist that the strength of the natural law 
theories rested on their implicit utilitarian (broadly conceived) 
foundations, which require some empirical evaluation of why given 
institutions promote human flourishing, and through it—general social 
welfare.  Under those tests, all legal rules are imperfect adjustments and 
trade-offs between competing goods.64  Quite simply, any system of 
private property imposes heavy costs of exclusion.  However, these costs 
can only be eliminated by adopting some system of collective ownership 
that for its part imposes heavy costs of governance.  The only choice that 
we have is to pick the lesser of two evils.  There is no magic solution for 
liberty or property that creates benefits without dislocations.  But once 
we recognize that trade-offs are an inescapable feature of social activity, 
we could conclude that a sensible system of copyright is not such a bad 
trade-off after all. 
 63. Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 417–19 (1987).  
For a discussion of this argument with respect to Eldred, see Richard A. Epstein, The 
“Necessary” History of Property and Liberty, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
 64. For one of my more recent statements of this view, see Richard A. Epstein, Let 
“The Fundamental Things Apply”: Necessary and Contingent Truths in Legal 
Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1291–92 (2002). 
